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

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WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT

WORLD PEACE

A WRITTEN DEBATE BETWEEN

WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT

AND

WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN

NEW YORK

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Introduction

I

UNIQUE interest attaches to this volume. The two chief advocates of the greatest idea in men's minds to-day speak in its pages.

The Honourable William Howard Taft, ex-President of the United States, eminent jurist and statesman, and The Honourable William Jennings Bryan, former Secretary of State, orator and publicist, debate the question which grows in importance with every event of the war—WORLD PEACE.

Oral debates between statesmen have always swayed the opinions of nations; and The Press Forum believes that it makes a distinct contribution to controversial literature by bringing these two minds which differ so emphatically into the illuminating contact of joint written discussion.

This is one of the first debates in writing to which the established rules for oral discussion have been adapted and applied. This form has

supreme utility. In the clarified atmosphere of his study, the debater considers his side of the question. His books are at hand. No audience makes its silent demand for consideration or distracts him by its political colour. He looks Truth in the face, undiverted.

To the thinker, the result of such debating comes with rich offerings. He can read both arguments. He can pronounce the verdict—an invaluable conclusion based on his own deductions from the reasonings of able minds. It is his; yet behind and beneath it, he has the best of re-inforcement.

This volume is therefore presented confidently as an excellent means by which the reader may weigh both sides and achieve a sure conviction on the vitally important question—WORLD PEACE.

II

In inviting Mr. Taft and Mr. Bryan to take part in this debate The Press Forum sent the following letter:

Professor William Howard Taft,
Hotel Taft,
New Haven, Conn.

My dear Professor Taft,—As President of The League to Enforce Peace and as former President

of the United States and as professor of International Law at one of America's foremost universities, your voice is unique for its authority on the subject of WORLD PEACE.

The Press Forum seeks to serve the world through aiding to clarify matters, issues, events and problems of vital public interest, by bringing leading minds which differ into contact through the medium of joint discussion in the public press.

You and Mr. Bryan are unquestionably the most notable leaders in the re-organisation of the world for peace. Each of you advocates a different means to the desired end. A joint discussion on "The Platform of the League to Enforce Peace" between yourself and Mr. Bryan would not only be of great social service as a means of public enlightenment, but may prove to be the mightiest of peaceful forces in the transformation of a warring world into a league to enforce peace.

We have wired a similar invitation to Mr. Bryan. Please telegraph your reply.

Respectfully,
The Press Forum, Inc.
Solon Fieldman, President.
501 Fifth Avenue,
New York City.

Mr. Taft's reply to this invitation was as follows:

New Haven, Conn.,
December 5th, 1916.

The Press Forum,
501 Fifth Avenue,
New York City.

Solon Fieldman, President:

I agree with The Press Forum that a pressing problem of humanity is THE ORGANISATION OF THE WORLD FOR PEACE and that a joint discussion in the public press on "THE PROPOSALS OF THE LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE" will help to make clear to the American People and the World what is necessary in the way of fraternal cooperation of the Nations to avoid and suppress war.

Because of my interest as President of the American branch of the LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE, and as one of its organisers, I deem it a privilege to accept your invitation, and an opportunity jointly with Honourable William Jennings Bryan to discuss the League's Proposals in the public press here and abroad, through the medium of THE PRESS FORUM.

Sincerely yours,
(Signed) WM. H. TAFT.

Mr. Bryan wrote in response:

Hotel La Fayette
Sixteenth Street at Eye Northwest
Washington, D. C.
December Sixth, Nineteen Sixteen.

The Press Forum, Inc.,
501 Fifth Avenue,
New York City.

Solon Fieldman, President:

The plan of The Press Forum to present to this Country and to the reading public of other lands a discussion of the ways and means for advancing the cause of Universal Peace appeals to me very strongly.

"The Platform of the League to Enforce Peace" offers a very proper basis for the discussion, and no one more completely personifies the aims of the League than ex-President Taft; and no one is better qualified by ability and high purpose to present the merits of the plan.

I shall be pleased to participate in this debate in the hope that a careful consideration of the arguments for and against these specific and concrete proposals may aid in establishing that which is best to our Country and the world.

Yours truly,

WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN.

Later, in explaining the purpose which animated them in undertaking the written debate, both Mr. Taft and Mr. Bryan set forth explicitly the things they hoped to accomplish and the conditions under which they wrote. These are valuable and most interesting for the reader. Mr. Taft wrote:

Mr. Fieldman invited Mr. Bryan and me to discuss the *pros* and *cons* of the League to Enforce Peace under the auspices of the Press Forum. I have been very glad to do so because I know no better way to bring the matter to the attention of the American public than by public discussion with a gentleman of the ability, prominence and large popular following and leadership which Mr. Bryan has. The League to Enforce Peace will involve this nation in serious obligations. If those obligations are not to be met promptly and willingly, it is far better that we should not enter the League at all. The best means of avoiding a failure to meet the obligations of the League by the United States is to have the people advised in advance of exactly what the League is, what burden it will entail, and what sacrifices will have to be made in order to accomplish its purposes, so that when the President and the Senate shall sign the treaty, they will be doing an act, the full purport of which and the

future consequences of which the people will understand, approve and be willing to meet. For reasons which it is not now necessary to specify, the articles were not published as soon as was expected. The kaleidoscope of international matters has changed rapidly in the last three or four months; and the fact that the earlier papers were prepared before the United States entered the war, should be known in order that their language can be understood."

Drawing attention to the desire for truth and not the success of any theory or plan, Mr. Bryan said:

"When this discussion was arranged, the prospect of our being drawn into the European war seemed quite remote; and the object of the disputants was to bring before the public the arguments in favour of and against the plan which the League to Enforce Peace proposed for the prevention of future wars.

Subsequent events in the theatre of war have resulted in the creation of a national situation which is now acute; and the thought of the public is occupied with present dangers rather than with plans for future peace. The subject itself, however, is sufficiently important to challenge the attention and enlist the interest of those who, feeling that they share in the responsibility for their government's course, seek to prepare themselves

for the intelligent discharge of the duties of citizenship. These papers are submitted in the hope that they may aid in bringing out the truth, which is the thing to be sought rather than the triumph of any theory or plan."

To complete this summary, it only remains to put before the reader the succinct Platform of the League to Enforce Peace out of which the whole debate grew. It contains four articles, as follows:

"It is desirable for the United States to join a league of nations binding the signatories to the following:

First: All justiciable questions arising between the signatory powers, not settled by negotiation, shall, subject to the limitations of treaties, be submitted to a Judicial Tribunal for hearing and judgment, both upon the merits and upon any issue as to its jurisdiction of the question.

Second: All other questions arising between the signatories and not settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to a Council of Conciliation for hearing, consideration and recommendation.

Third: The signatory powers shall jointly use forthwith both their economic and military forces against any one of their number that goes to war, or commits acts of hostility, against another of the signatories before any question arising shall be submitted as provided in the foregoing.

Fourth: Conferences between the signatory powers shall be held from time to time to formulate and codify rules of international law, which, unless some signatory shall signify its dissent within a stated period, shall thereafter govern in the decisions of the Judicial Tribunal mentioned in Article One."

The propositions to be discussed by the debaters were three in number; and the reader will find them set forth by their respective advocates in the following order:

One: "Is the platform of the League to Enforce Peace feasible?"

Two: "Does the platform of the League to Enforce Peace furnish the most practical plan for securing permanent peace after the end of the present war?"

Three: "Should the United States become a signatory to the League to Enforce Peace?"

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TOPIC NUMBER ONE

IS THE PLATFORM OF THE LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE FEASIBLE?

Mr. Taft's First Argument

Is the Platform of the League to Enforce Peace Feasible?

THE platform is not a program to stop the present war. It looks to a treaty to be adopted at or after its close. Its purpose is to enforce deliberation, impartial investigation and judgment of a cause of international quarrel before hostilities. It does not seek to enforce the decision after it is rendered; but by making clear to the threatening nations and to the world what the real issue is, and what an impartial Tribunal thinks about it, the enforced procedure and the necessary delay will prevent most wars.

To make the platform work, the eight or nine great Powers should join the League. The weaker nations will then be glad to secure the benefit of its protection. Will the great belligerent Powers join? Lord Grey and Mr. Asquith of Great Britain, M. Briand of France, and Dr. Bethmann-Hollweg of Germany are representative of them. They have approved the principles of the

League. Lord Grey says that the war should not end without it. President Wilson, Mr. Hughes and Mr. Lodge uphold it. These personal expressions do not bind the Nations; but they show that the general plan is feasible and supplies a want which the world feels.

The platform only lays down broad lines. Its machinery must be worked out in International Conference. Its feasibility is not successfully attacked by exceptional hypotheses under which it would fail of its purpose. The most practical plan of government may thus be shown to be futile. If the platform will work in most cases, the value of the result justifies its adoption.

Are the four planks considered in detail feasible?

1. A Court to administer international justice is not new. Our own Supreme Court is one. Questions arise between States not settled by the Federal Constitution or Federal statutes. Kansas sued Colorado, complaining that Colorado was using for irrigation the Arkansas River, running through both States, so as to deprive Kansas of its use. Congress had no power to control Colorado. International Law alone fixed the rights between the States; and the Supreme Court enforced them.

Our relations with Canada are such that we settle all questions by negotiation or arbitration. We have now two permanent Tribunals to decide controversies between us—one to adjudge questions of boundary waters like that between Kansas and Colorado, and the other to pass upon claims of the citizens of one country against the other. We have thus contracted the habit of arbitration; and, when negotiation fails, no one expects anything else. In our League, the quarrelling nations, moved by their obligation, sanctioned by the threat of compulsion by their associates, will contract the same habit.

2. There may be, however, political or other irritating and threatening issues between Nations which cannot be settled on principles of law. They are to be submitted under the second plank for hearing and recommendation of compromise. We lost our Fur Seal arbitration with England, because the Arbitrators held we could not lawfully punish Canadian sealers for killing female seals in the Bering Sea beyond the three mile limit, even though they thus destroyed our valuable herd on the Pribilof Islands. Acting as a Board of Conciliation, however, they recommended a compromise to save the seals. The four nations inter-

ested—Russia, Japan, England and the United States—embodied the compromise in a treaty; and now the herd has been restored to its former size and value.

3. The third or *Force* plank gives vitality to the platform. It appeals to practical men. It provides for economic pressure and a Police Force to hold off members of the League from war until the cooling and curative influence of the League's judicial procedure may have time to operate.

No matter how law-abiding a community, neither the statutes nor judgments of the Courts enforce themselves so as to dispense with police or sheriffs. They may be called on infrequently to suppress disorder, or to remove obstruction to judicial decree. The fact that they are present, however, in the community, or in the Court, with the power to act and the intention to act, when necessary, stays would-be disturbers or obstructors. Fear of police action is usually effective without actual use of force. "They also serve who only stand and wait."

4. No one will doubt the feasibility of the fourth plank. Successful Congresses for declaring the principles of International Law and enlarging

their scope have been held before. Such was the Congress at Paris in 1856, in which privateering was abolished.

The agreement of all the powerful nations of the world to unite their armies and their navies to resist the premature hostilities of one or more nations against another, must increase the binding effect of the obligation of the League members not to rush into sudden war. The fear of forcible restraint would thus, in most cases, render actual resort to it unnecessary.

The League is to be a world alliance. We have had precedents of successful alliances for the purpose of protecting the parties to them against outside attack. In various junctures in the past, these alliances have preserved peace. The fear of their united force has prevented others from attacking a single member.

Moreover, the binding effect of such alliances has shown itself. France, with no interest in Servia, and with the danger of being crushed by Germany, keeps the letter of her agreement with Russia. England, with no interest in Servia, maintains her obligation to Belgium; while Germany, without interest in Servia, upholds her word to Austria. Treaties may sometimes be broken; but as

the best hope of securing international progress, we should not abandon them. The fear of another World War, which will lead the great Powers into our League, will also lead them to meet its obligation.

Mr. Bryan's First Argument

Is the Platform of the League to Enforce Peace Feasible?

I ENTER upon this discussion, conscious of the great importance of the subject under consideration, and fully sharing in the laudable desire of the members of the League to contribute toward the establishment of an enduring peace. I recognize, too, the high standing of those who direct the activities of the League and appreciate the fact that much weight is, and should be, given to their opinion.

The word "feasible" includes the idea of practicability; and it, of course, means feasible from our standpoint, which takes into consideration our nation's welfare and existing obligations; but, as subsequent arguments deal with the practicability of the League's plans, as compared with other plans, and with the attitude which our nation should assume towards it, I shall to-day consider the wisdom of the plan.

Universal and lasting peace is both desirable

and possible. There was a time when some thought war a moral tonic—actually believed that men would degenerate if not kept up to fighting pitch; but this delusion, repugnant to humanity as well as to religion, has been dispelled by the unspeakable horrors of this unprecedented war. No European monarch is willing to admit responsibility for beginning the present conflict; and the end of the war will be in sight when the rulers in the belligerent nations realize that, the consequences being more appalling than any one could have foreseen, the responsibility for continuing the war is even more grave than responsibility for commencing it.

War is not only undesirable and should be prevented, if prevention is possible; but the peace plan proposed by this nation, and now embodied in thirty treaties and formally endorsed in principle by three other nations which have not yet entered into treaties with us—this plan, providing for investigation in all cases, being based upon the theory that there are no disputes which must necessarily be settled by force, commits us and three-quarters of the world outside to the proposition that war may be prevented.

One objection to the League's plan, considered

From the Painting by Irving R. Wiles

WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN

in the abstract, is that it pledges the contracting nations to use force in case diplomacy and economic pressure (I shall later ask for an explanation of the phrase) fail. This is the official interpretation placed upon the third provision. It is true that force is to be employed, not in compelling acceptance of the findings of an International Tribunal, but only to coerce unwilling nations into submitting their disputes to inquiry, with a view to arbitration of justiciable causes and to conciliatory effort in other disputes. This, of course, lessens the objection in proportion as it lessens the probability of a resort to force; and there is also less excuse for the rejection of the principle of investigation than there might be for refusal to abide by a decision thought to be unjust.

But objection to the principle is not removed; and the lessening of the probability may be apparent rather than real, for it may be offset by the greater confidence given by increased strength —that is, the value of our aid in case of war might encourage other members of the League to acts which would precipitate war. It must be remembered also that nations, when bitterly hostile and really seeking a cause of war, may be guilty of acts which will be interpreted as rendering a

peaceful settlement impossible when not technically constituting war.

But let us consider force as a preserver of peace. Do not reason and experience combine to prove that it provokes rather than prevents war?

The plan of the League to Enforce Peace rests on the theory that previous wars have arisen from an insufficient display of force—the alliances not having included enough nations or the preparation not having been adequate.

The plan, it will be noticed, is not conditioned upon its acceptance by all nations—not even upon its acceptance by any specified number. The language is: "It is desirable for the United States to join a league of nations binding the signatories to the following, etc." But suppose only a few nations enter the League; does it make no difference how few? And is it a matter of indifference what nations join? Europe is now divided into two powerful groups; and they are at war. Is it proposed that we shall join one of these groups without regard to the action taken by the members of the other group? That would make a larger alliance than ever before formed; but would that give assurance of peace? This war, without a parallel, is between groups larger than ever

acted together before. Will the League build its hope of peace upon its ability to assemble a larger military and naval force than was ever brought together before? Was not this unprecedented conflict preceded by preparation without a precedent?

What new hope does the proposed employment of greater force hold out? Over and over again, this hope has been found empty and vain. Force as a means of promoting peace has been "weighed in the balance and found wanting." Reliance upon it gives to diplomacy a threatening tone, breeds conspiracies and intrigues, and inspires hatreds instead of friendships. The age-long attempt of powerful nations, sometimes acting alone and sometimes in groups, to terrorize the world into peace has failed and failed miserably. Is it not time to abandon the philosophy of Pilate? The militarists and manufacturers of munitions have been permitted to set up false standards of honour, which increase the reputations of the former and the fortunes of the latter, by the slaughter of masses of men who have no grievance against each other and know not why they are ordered to kill one another.

Proposal of better plans is reserved for future

arguments. My present task is to point out that the League's plan is not new in principle; it merely extends and enlarges a plan which the world has outgrown—a plan which has written history in characters of blood and filled the earth with unutterable woe. For this nation to exchange its moral prestige for the expensive privilege of putting its army and navy at the command of European monarchs, to be used in settling European quarrels, would be retrogression, not progress—a stepping down, not ascent to a higher plane.

Mr. Taft's Second Argument

Is the Platform of the League to Enforce Peace Feasible?

THE League is not a defensive league against outside nations. It does not defend its members against non-members. Its purpose is to furnish a means of keeping peace among its own members only. It proposes to secure World Peace by attracting to its membership, first, all the great powers, and then the lesser powers which will surely follow. The logic of circumstances must inevitably force the great powers engaged in this war to membership. In seeking permanent peace, whether they wish it or not, the League must be their common goal.

The Allies proclaim their purpose to be to secure a permanent basis for peace, safeguarded by practical guaranties, that is, of superior force. What is that but the League?

Germany's Chancellor avows her willingness to join a league to "suppress disturbers of peace." The League is only a wise preparation of the

members, by organization of their united potential force, to frighten from its purpose a would-be disturber of the World's Peace, and thus probably make use of actual force unnecessary.

Germany now proposes peace with suggestion of a limitation of armaments. In the Hague conferences, Germany declined to consider such a limitation. Such a suggestion by her now looks necessarily to a continuing "Bund" to exact the limitation. This is only a logical corollary to our proposals. Our League must deal with armaments and fix a minimum to secure effective joint action. Why not a maximum?

Again, whether Germany's present proposals are now to lead to peace or not, serious negotiations must sometime come; and then conditions will make for a League like ours. One of Germany's motives in offering peace is, of course, her desire to satisfy her own people that the almost unbearable burdens they have, their Government is anxious to end. In Russia, the power of control is passing from the Bureaucracy to the Council and the Duma. When whole peoples constitute the armies and the makers of war supplies, as never before, and all of them are enduring the sweat and woe and blood, their will determines

policies. Otherwise dynasties fall. In all history, no time can find the contending peoples so anxious for guaranties of permanent peace as at the end of this war. Lord Grey's words, that the war cannot and should not end without such a League, will find an echo in all their hearts.

It is these circumstances that make the League feasible. Difficulties are suggested. They concern the detail of operation rather than the main principles. If the nations are determined to make such a League, as they will be, they can arrange the details.

Of course, a council or other joint body of representatives of the League must act in case of strained relations between League members. It will naturally use diplomatic pressure to prevent a rupture. Such a body in negotiation with them will have excellent opportunity to learn which of the contestants intends a breach of its plighted faith. Upon the decision of such a council, all members of the League, in compliance with the third article, will withhold commerce or dealing with the recalcitrant. A boycott of this kind would be a powerful deterrent weapon and probably make resort to force unnecessary.

But it is said that force is not a feasible means

of securing and maintaining peace. To say so is to ignore history and experience, domestic and international. Fear of forcible restraint and punishment is often an indispensable motive to strengthen moral impulse to obey the law and follow the right. That it may not be needed by some does not render it safe to dispense with it in the case of others. If we need fear of restraint to keep men in paths of peace and law, why not nations? Nations are only men united in communities; and they have not the moral self-restraint of the average man. Force used for selfish, vicious or improper ends is, of course, to be deplored. But is there any method of defeating force used for such ends, except superior force threatened or applied for the common good? Has force or fear of it never done any good among the nations? What was it that kept Louis XIV's greedy hand out of the Spanish Netherlands but the fear of the League of England, Holland and Sweden? What was it that stopped Napoleon in his mad lust for universal domination but a League of all Europe, welded by England, against him? The fact that, after the Napoleonic wars, this League degenerated, as the Holy Alliance, into a selfish plot of an inner ring to promote the

divine right of kings, does not detract from the useful purpose it originally served. What was it but force that cut out the cancer of slavery in our body politic? What was it but force that freed Cuba from oppression? Have men changed since these wars, that force or fear of force is not now needed at times to help a just cause to prevail?

Before the present war, the Triple Alliance on the one side and the Triple Entente on the other, divided Europe into two vast and powerful camps; and men spoke of their promoting peace, on the theory that one sword would keep the other in its scabbard. These Leagues did for a time prevent attack upon single members; but ultimately they failed. This war was precipitated because they were divided against each other; and there were other motives in their maintenance than a mere preservation of peace. Their failure offers no argument against the feasibility and success of our League. Its members could not organize separate leagues and be honest or consistent members of ours. The League's simple plan of unity of power, with but one purpose of forcibly maintaining World Peace by deliberation, hearing and decision before hostilities, distinguishes it in its aim and practical moderation from all others.

Mr. Bryan's Second Argument

Is the Platform of the League to Enforce Peace Feasible?

MR. Taft, in his first argument, presents the plan of the League to Enforce Peace in its most attractive form.

Replying to his reference to the endorsement of the plan by the President and Mr. Hughes, I reply that neither has committed himself to any plan sufficiently specific to enable the public to pass judgment upon it; and as, according to Mr. Taft, the platform must be made practical by machinery, "worked out in international conference," it is impossible for any one to know until the "machinery" is decided upon whether or not he would favour it in its completed form.

Then, too, it must be remembered that, as the constitution vests in Congress, and in Congress only, the right to declare war, no plan that pledges the country, even conditionally, to engage in war can make much progress until Congress approves it. During Mr. Taft's administration the Senate

took exception to two very important treaties because its members thought that that body's rights were not sufficiently protected. If the Senate would insist upon being consulted on each proposal to arbitrate, is it likely that Congress would consent to any plan that would entirely surrender its right to a voice in deciding when the country should be plunged into war?

The cases which Mr. Taft cites do not support his contention. Arbitration is desirable where possible; investigation is desirable in all cases. This government can and should participate in creating and conducting a Court for the settlement of all questions which are justiciable. And our government should also join in the formation of Boards of Conciliation for the investigation of all disputes, with power to recommend. We have already embodied in thirty treaties, with nations exercising authority over three-fourths of all the people on the globe, the idea of investigation before war. My connection with the plan and with the negotiation of the treaties based upon it would estop me from objecting to the application of the principle over any area, however wide; and I have no disposition to object. On the contrary, I believe in the plan and regard it as the longest single

step ever taken in the direction of universal peace; but the League for which Mr. Taft speaks violates the spirit of this reform in proposing to engraft upon it the doctrine of force—a doctrine which not only turns attention away from conciliatory methods but has been "the root of all evil" in international matters.

The "economic pressure" which, according to the third plank of the platform, is to be resorted to before the employment of force, is a very vague phrase. What is to be included under the head of "economic pressure"? Will Mr. Taft interpret the phrase for us? Who is to decide what kind of pressure shall be employed? Is this a part of the "machinery," which is to be left to the International Conference? It is more than possible—it is, in fact, quite probable that this nation would be unwilling to join in some of the kinds of economic pressure that might be proposed by European nations, just as it would be unwilling to join in some of the methods which have recently been employed in war.

But whatever uncertainties may be concealed in the details to be worked out in International Conference, one thing is clear, namely, that the employment of *Force* is the central thought, the

ground upon which the hope of success is built. Mr. Taft's language leaves no doubt on this point. "The third or *Force* plank," he says, "gives vitality to the platform"; and he underscores the word *Force*. "It appeals to practical men," he adds. The Court may plant; and the Board of Conciliation may water; but, if I may be permitted to paraphrase an oft-quoted sentence from the Bible, *Force* must give the increase. "The fear of forcible restraint," he predicts, "would thus, in most cases, render resort to it unnecessary."

This is the false philosophy with which professional soldiers and traffickers in war material have deluded the world for ages. If a war fails to bring about a permanent peace, the remedy they propose is another war. If a million men under arms are not sufficient to police the world, they suggest two million, or five, or ten; but force, greater force and still greater force—these are the only means they know.

The fundamental error lies in the fact that a plan which relies upon "Force" for its "vitality," *cultivates the spirit that breeds war*. Men used to think it necessary to carry weapons in order to make their neighbours afraid of them; but experience showed that the practice resulted in the

setting up of false standards of honour and led men to say and do the things that provoked personal encounters. Neighbourhood peace has been promoted by an abandonment of the practice; men now cultivate friendship instead of trying to excite fear.

Why not test the friendship plan among nations? The world has tried rivalry in battleship-building, rivalry in the raising and equipping of battalions, rivalry in the use of bursting shells and suffocating gases. Nations have tried to terrorize other nations by drowning women and children at sea and by starving women and children on land, and with what result? War has grown more expensive and more bloody; and enmities have become more implacable. Alternate retaliations and competitive cruelties have only added fuel to the flame until the world is maddened by misery and blinded by hate. The members of the League to Enforce Peace are deeply stirred by the havoc caused by the "dogs of war"—and it is to their credit that they are—but they still cling to the theory that, "the hair of the dog will cure the bite." They propose imitation of European methods instead of the setting of a better example.

They adopt the logic of the convivial man who, when a boon companion in the gutter appealed to him for assistance, replied: "I can't help you up; but I will lie down with you."

Mr. Taft's Third Argument

Is the Platform of the League to Enforce Peace Feasible?

UNDER our agreement, this argument is limited to replies to Mr. Bryan's objections to the League in his first two papers. Two of his objections as to the probable attitude of the people of the United States toward "economic pressure" and toward the sending of United States troops into European campaigns, are arguments to be considered under the third head of this discussion, "Should the United States join the League"; and I postpone answer until we come to that question.

Mr. Bryan objects that if only a part of the nations entered the League, there would ensue a test of military strength between the League group of nations and other groups. This objection finds no warrant in our plan because the League deals not at all with non-members, but only with differences between League members. Of course, if but a part of the nations consented to join the League, the plan would not work. To be useful

and accomplish its purpose, it must have world membership. In my last paper, I showed why it would have this, because the great powers now in war, and then the lesser powers, would and must seek such a League when peace comes.

Mr. Bryan objects that confidence in the armed support of the League would prompt a League member to acts rendering peaceful settlement impossible and precipitating war. This rests on the same misconception as to the League's attitude toward non-members. As between members, such motive would be slight. The Council of the League, in using diplomatic pressure to prevent a rupture between two members, would have full opportunity to know and report which was really forcing hostilities; and the League would act accordingly.

Mr. Bryan objects to a League with force in it because we have already made thirty-one treaties agreeing to investigation before war which contain no provision for force. An agreement for investigation and orderly procedure before war and a subsequent agreement providing a world police force to compel such procedure are not inconsistent.

Mr. Bryan asks what is meant by "economic

pressure." I answer—a boycott of the unruly nation—an embargo threatened or imposed by all the members of the League on their trade with the recalcitrant member. Such an embargo must of necessity accompany war, because war means the cessation of commerce between the belligerent parties. The boycott or embargo may, however, precede war and prevent it. This is the part which it is intended to play in our plan.

Mr. Bryan's whole argument thus far against the League is an argument against the evils of war. But I submit this is not to the point if war persists. The use of force to suppress a small war, however undesirable, is better than a world-war, and is justified in avoiding it. Mr. Bryan says, "Why not test the friendship plan among nations?" History has oftentimes tested it and found that it did not work. While peaceful means of avoiding war are becoming more successful than in the past, the present war has convinced the world that a plan for the peaceful settlement of international quarrels will be more certainly effective if the nations of the world unite in their own interest to compel the working of the plan. The present war has brought home to them their deep interest in stopping every war, however re-

mote, in order to prevent the conflagration's spreading.

Mr. Bryan says that force breeds violence and cites the useful change from the time when all men carried weapons to the time when they gave up the practice. The instance is not helpful to his argument. Men gave up weapons when they could rely on the police, exercising the force of the community, to protect them against violence. By analogy, if our plan becomes effective, it will offer a strong inducement to limit armaments—a proposal that Germany has already unofficially given out.

Would Mr. Bryan dispense with the police in city, state and nation? Does he think a state or national prohibition law would enforce itself without the arrest of offenders and their restraint and punishment? Will "the friendship plan," without any public force in the background, work well in any of our communities, however law-abiding? If not, why should it among the nations?

I agree that the analogy between the domestic police force and the union of the forces of the nations of the world is not complete because of the difficulty of effective international co-opera-

tion; but the essential principle which justifies and requires the use of force in each case is the same, to wit, that all the people have a right and duty to exert their united force to suppress violence between individuals disturbing the community, and that all nations have a right and duty to use their united forces to suppress a disturbance of international peace which may involve the whole world.

Mr. Bryan questions whether the President's words or those of Mr. Hughes, in respect to the League, are sufficiently specific to justify my use of them. They were used by the speakers with the League's proposals in mind, not only to approve them all, but especially the third or *force* proposal, which is the one to which Mr. Bryan chiefly objects.

Of course, if the United States or any other nation is to join the League, its principles will be embodied in a treaty with all the necessary working details. This treaty should not be ratified unless it is approved, after full knowledge and consideration of the details, not only by the treaty-making agency of each power, but also by the great body of its people and its legislature or congress, upon whom must fall the serious burden

of performance of the treaty obligations. This would be needed to give assurance that the League would really hold the nations when the strain comes.

Mr. Bryan's Third Argument

Is the Platform of the League to Enforce Peace Feasible?

MR. TAFT'S second argument gives an important detail of the plan of the League to Enforce Peace—and that detail shows how necessary the details are to any intelligent consideration of the plan; and it also shows how quickly the defects of a faulty plan are disclosed when its inner workings are laid bare.

Mr. Taft says: "Our League must deal with armaments and fix a minimum to secure effective joint action." So armaments are to be standardized; the nations that have too small an army and navy will be compelled to take upon themselves the burden of an increase; and nations that have too large an equipment will be permitted to reduce. This is more than a detail; it is a vital part of the plan.

And who is to decide the question of increase or decrease? Mr. Taft says: "Of course, a Council or other joint body of representatives of the

League must act in case of strained relations," etc. Will this "joint body" have power to decide the quota of each member of the League and enforce payment? Or will that matter be made a part of the agreement upon which it is proposed to organize the League? If it is to be determined in advance, the quota must be known before the question of feasibility can be determined. If it is to be left to a joint body to decide, what nation (unless assured of a controlling voice in the Council) would turn over to a committee or commission the decision of such a matter?

Objections from the standpoint of our nation will be stated later; but would any self-respecting nation surrender the right to determine for itself and its people the minimum amount of armament needed for its protection?

The power to tax has been characterized as the power to destroy; is it safe for any nation to transfer to a Council controlled by others the all-embracing power to tax, and bind its people to meet any assessment that may be levied by the Council?

The nations may be divided into two groups—those that maintain large armies or navies, or both, and those that content themselves with more

modest military and naval appropriations. The League's plan would seem to contemplate, not a reduction of over-grown military and naval establishments, but a *compulsory increase in taxation for military purposes by the members of the second group at the demand of the more militant nations.*

The League's plan is open to an objection even more serious, namely, the surrender of the right of each League nation to control its own military and naval policy.

To put a nation's neck under a foreign yoke and coerce it into taxing its citizens to meet a foreign-made assessment would be sure to arouse opposition among any liberty-loving people, but to delegate to a foreign Council or to alien Governments authority to determine its national policy on the question of armaments—this would be intolerable. No nation, however small, could for a moment consider such an abandonment of sovereignty. The League's plan, too, would, if successful, effectually close the door to competition in the reduction of armaments; in other words, the League would lead the world back into darkness, not toward the dawn.

It would be interesting, if it were not so serious,

to note how this "fire and sword" doctrine blinds the eyes of its champions to other and better methods. We shall soon begin the discussion of better methods; but attention is at this time called to the fact that no other remedy for war is thought of by the advocates of force. Why? Because no other remedy harmonizes with it. Mars is a jealous god; he insists upon an undivided allegiance.

Lord Grey is quoted as saying that "war cannot and should not end" without such a League; and Germany is described as willing to join a League to "suppress disturbers of the peace"; and Mr. Taft's League promptly responds that it is ready to bring together a force sufficient to "frighten from its purpose a would-be disturber of the World's Peace." Still "worshipping the scimiter"! Nothing else is thought of. And that, too, in spite of the fact that this is exactly the plan that has just failed and, by its failure, convulsed the world.

Mr. Taft points to the use of force in the past; that is unnecessary. Unhappily, there are illustrations in abundance. It is admitted that force may exercise a temporary restraint—just as one may, by drawing a revolver on an unarmed man, post-

pone the day of reckoning until the other man can arm himself—but force instead of settling disputes only aggravates them.

His citations are unfortunate. He admits that the League that "stopped Napoleon" afterward "degenerated into a selfish plot to promote the divine rights of kings." Who will guarantee the world that the League to promote Peace would not—after its present officials are dead, of course —degenerate into a plot to furnish contracts for traffickers in war material and life positions for men trained to the profession of arms?

Mr. Taft points out that the two European groups now at war kept the peace for a time, on the theory that "one sword would keep the other in its scabbard,"—a convenient and profitable theory for the sword-maker—; but he confesses that there were "other motives" for the formation of these opposing groups. Have these "other motives" entirely disappeared? Is it not conceivable that the nations may still have "other motives" for combining than an interest in peace? Is it likely that the belligerent nations, when they emerge from this war which, in its costliness, its cruelties and in hatreds engendered, surpasses any former war, can entirely forget present alliances

and enter into a League to Enforce Peace, without bias and ready to act impartially on all questions, without regard to past connections? And, is a League to Enforce Peace feasible unless the members are animated by such a spirit—and in position to act fairly?

TOPIC NUMBER TWO

DOES THE PLATFORM OF THE LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE FURNISH THE MOST PRACTICAL PLAN FOR SECURING PERMANENT PEACE AFTER THE END OF THE PRESENT WAR?

Mr. Taft's Fourth Argument

Does the Platform of the League to Enforce Peace Furnish the Most Practical Plan for Securing Permanent Peace After the End of the Present War?

IS the platform of the League the most practical plan for securing permanent peace after the war?

Should the League attempt more than it does? Should it enforce the judgments of the Court and the recommendations for compromise by the Commission? The two must be distinguished. A judgment between nations, like a domestic judgment, might be enforced. But nations will reasonably object to final submission of vital interests to the discretion of arbitrators, however impartial, in recommending compromise of an issue not controlled by principles of law. The Supreme Court of the United States renders and enforces judgments between the States on justiciable issues; but, although given broad authority to hear "controversies between States," it refuses to decide

issues not involving the application of principles of law. They must be settled by agreement or go unsettled. A judgment binds the parties in honour to its terms. This aids to secure acquiescence. But a recommendation of compromise implies no such moral sanction. The League has deemed it best not to attempt the enforcement of either judgments or compromises. It is wise for it not to try too much, lest being over ambitious, it fail.

There are said to be wrongs which only war can remedy. If so, our plan does not prevent such a remedy. It enforces investigation, discussion, deliberation and impartial decision before war is begun and avoids most wars. If a war between members of the League is inevitable and necessary, the delay secured will enable the remainder of the League to hedge it about so as not to permit its spread.

Is a plan *without force in it* more practical than that of the League? It is not practical at all because the present belligerent powers could not be induced to adopt it. They demand effective guaranties of future peace. They will not trust to the security of a League which depends for its maintenance of peace on the mere promises of its mem-

bers to abide a judicial settlement. In their minds, nothing will be effective which will not unite the superior force of all for the common good to secure the world against the aggression of reckless and faithless disturbers of its peace. Without such a result, the war will, in their view, have been fought in vain.

The psychological effect of this war upon the world has not been to vindicate the purely non-resistant pacifists or to increase their number. It has been to increase "the militant pacifists," to use a paradox, who are now willing to consent to the use of force if it be directed to the maintenance of the just peace of the world.

Mr. Bryan objects to the obligation of every member of the League to be ready to do its share in making the police force. What good could come from a police force if it had to be organized after the riot alarm was turned in? Each nation, therefore, must know what force it should furnish, and should in good faith keep in a state of reasonable preparation to respond to a call. The share of each member will have to be generally prescribed in the fundamental agreement of the League, and must vary in number and kind with the geographical location and resources of the

member and other circumstances. A self-respecting nation, bound jointly with others to constitute an international police force, may agree without the least sacrifice of dignity, to keep ready a force to fulfil its obligation. It could well afford to do so, because the security afforded by the joint forces of the League will reduce the reasonable preparation needed for its own defence.

Mr. Bryan insists that our League with its obligations will increase armaments. On the contrary, it will reduce them and the taxes necessary to maintain them. Indeed the working out of our plan must inevitably furnish the strongest motive for an agreement to reduce and limit armaments, in accord with the intimation of Germany already referred to.

Mr. Bryan objects to the surrender by each member of its control over its own military and naval policy. If so, he objects to the reduction and limitation of maximum armaments supervised by the League,—a plan which I supposed had the approval of the most extreme pacifists. Every treaty between two nations which accomplishes any good involves a surrender on the part of each of some right which it is willing to limit to accomplish a greater benefit.

The fear, expressed by Mr. Bryan and others that such a League would degenerate into a trap for the peaceful nations to serve the purpose of designing and ambitious warlike members, has little to justify it. The unity, strength and permanence of the League must depend on its justice and fairness. The perversion of its high purpose shown in the action of any group attempting its control must inevitably and promptly lead to its dissolution.

A League for judicial settlement of international disputes without force would prove a step forward; but it would be far short of our League in efficacy and scope. It would cover only questions of a legal nature. Many issues likely to provoke war would not come within it. The element of force in our League gives it an advantage not measured solely by the sanction it adds to its obligations. It will give to every member of the League a sense of responsibility for the peace of the world. It would create a union of interest among the members, wholly absent in a League for judicial settlement in which a refusal to submit to the court concerns only the refusing member and its opponent and involves the other members of the League in no responsibility. Our

League, through the active and stimulated concern of every member in the continuing friendship of all, would bring the nations much nearer to "the Parliament of Man and the Federation of the World."

Mr. Bryan's Fourth Argument

Does the Platform of the League to Enforce Peace Furnish the Most Practical Plan for Securing Permanent Peace After the End of the Present War?

WE have now reached the discussion of the Second question, namely: "Does the League to Enforce Peace Furnish the Most Practical Plan for Securing Permanent Peace after the End of the Present War?"

To this question I answer, NO, and respectfully submit for consideration three substitute plans, only one of which can be set forth in this article. Thirty treaties have recently been negotiated by our government with governments exercising authority over one billion three hundred millions of people or three-fourths of the population of the world. The League accepts the principle embodied in the plan but adds a sort of gattling-gun attachment. The plan needs no such aid.

The twenty-six arbitration treaties previously

negotiated represented the most advanced thought in treaty-making, prior to the proposal for *investigation in all cases;* but these arbitration treaties had two serious defects; first, they expired by limitation at the end of five years, and, as each renewal must be ratified by a two-thirds vote in the Senate, a minority of the Senate, if one more than one-third, could prevent an extension of the treaty in spite of the efforts of the president and a majority of the Senate. In other words, these treaties gave the presumption to war instead of to peace.

But, what was more serious, the twenty-six arbitration treaties contained four exceptions, namely, questions of honour, questions of independence, vital interests and the interests of third parties—the very controversies out of which wars are most likely to grow.

Europe was as helpless. The belligerent nations had machinery for war; but they had no machinery for the settlement of disputes which defied diplomatic treatment. The thirty treaties, negotiated between April 26th, 1913, and January 1st, 1915, were intended to close the gap; and they do close the gap. They continue in force until twelve months after one of the contracting

parties asks for their revocation, thus giving the presumption to peace, instead of to war; and they cover all disputes of every kind and character. According to the plan embodied in these thirty treaties, every dispute which is not, according to the terms of an arbitration treaty, to be submitted to some commission for final settlement, must, when diplomacy fails, be submitted to a permanent international tribunal for investigation and report; and a year's time is allowed for such investigation, during which time there shall be no declaration of war or other appeal to force.

These treaties do not make war impossible; but they make it a REMOTE POSSIBILITY. Great Britain, France, Russia and Italy have joined in these treaties (the first three since this war began); and Germany, Austria and Belgium have formally endorsed the principles although they have not yet signed treaties.

As these seven nations, now involved in war, have thus accepted the principle of *Investigation Before War*, it is fair to assume that they will be willing to enter into such a treaty with each other (if not, they certainly will not accept the League plan); and, if they do bind themselves to await a thorough investigation of every dispute before

beginning hostilities, the chances are many to one in favor of the finding of a peaceful adjustment of any dispute that may arise. A week's time for investigation would probably have prevented the present war; a month's time would quite certainly have done so. A year's time would allow passion to subside and reason to resume her sway, time for the separation of questions of honour from questions of fact, time for the peace forces of the world to bring influence to bear on the estranged nations. Why not try this plan built upon persuasion instead of adopting a plan to which "the force plank gives vitality"?

The bitter experience through which the European nations have passed ought to make them receptive. They have read the fallacy of their philosophy in the lurid light of war; they have heard its failure in the roar of giant guns. The theory of *peace by terrorism* has exploded with bursting shells.

Why not offer a new hope built upon the plan which has been proved so successful between individuals? If two neighbours fall out, they call in friends, if their relations have become too strained to permit personal discussions of differences and allow time for investigation and friend-

ly advice. Each party reserves the right of independent action at the conclusion of the investigation, just as the contracting parties do in the thirty treaties. The success of efforts at reconciliation depends largely upon the spirit in which the conference is conducted; the prospect of a peaceful settlement would be very much lessened if the conference was opened with threats or with a display of weapons.

The League to Enforce Peace violates the spirit of our treaty plan. It would send forth a dove of peace, to be sure; but its dove would carry a sword instead of an olive branch.

It is not contended that the American peace plan is perfect; but it is offered in the belief that it is a nearer approach to perfection than has been made heretofore—as near an approach as the times will permit. *Arbitration* of all questions might seem to promise greater assurance of peace than the mere *investigation* of all questions. But arbitration of all questions is not now possible; and, even if it were possible, it is an open question whether voluntary acceptance of the findings may not be as effective as compulsory acceptance, because investigators must appeal to reason and a sense of justice, while arbitrators act under less

restraint because the parties have agreed in advance to accept the result, whatever it may be.

I venture to suggest, therefore, that the League change its name by substituting the word Promote for the word Enforce, and then employ its great influence to persuade the nations of Europe to enter into treaties with each other embodying the American plan, relying upon the cultivation of friendship—instead of fear—to ensure the faithful observance of the treaties.

Mr. Taft's Fifth Argument

Does the Platform of the League to Enforce Peace Furnish the Most Practical Plan for Securing Permanent Peace After the End of the Present War?

MR. Bryan suggests a League of Nations of which the members agree to delay war for a year of investigation and report by a permanent tribunal. This is on the basis of the stipulations of treaties negotiated by him as Secretary of State with thirty separate nations. Our League's proposals recognise the value of delay and investigation in avoiding hotheaded resort to war. But Mr. Bryan's plan did not include a judgment by a Court or a recommendation of compromise by a Commission. Thus he has advanced some, but little. He suggests that an arbitral judgment or recommendation after investigation and hearing is less likely to secure a peaceful adjustment than a mere investigation and report without conclusion and decision. This is not sound. The decision of an impartial tribunal

must always be some moral sanction in securing from the disputing parties peaceful acquiescence in a settlement. He says that investigators will appeal to the reason and sense of justice of the parties, while arbitrators, in dealing with parties bound to abide their decision, are not so likely to do so. On the contrary, the most searching and just criticism of international arbitrations is that their judgments are rather compromises, intended to appeal to the acquiescence of the parties, than straight decisions on principles of law.

Mr. Bryan urges that a treaty obligation of two nations to maintain a period of delay and investigation before hostilities, is inconsistent with a compact of all other nations forcibly to require the two nations to keep their engagement. Why should this make the delay and investigation less likely than when dependent on the naked promises of the two nations in the heat of quarrel? How is the insistence of all other nations upon the delay likely to create war between the quarrelling nations? Mr. Bryan says "the League to Enforce Peace violates the spirit of our treaty plan; it would send forth a dove of peace, to be sure, but its dove would carry a sword instead of an olive branch." With deference, this is mere

rhetoric. It is not dealing with facts as they are, or with human nature as it is. If it be a logical argument, then the presence of a policeman in a community to arrest law breakers and of a court to punish them, violates the spirit of the law which all are under a moral obligation to obey. Mr. Bryan says that when two neighbors fall out, they call in their friends and allow time for investigation and friendly advice, each party reserving the right of independent action after the conference, and that the prospect of settlement is much lessened if the conference is opened with a display of weapons. This is not the usual way of settling such disputes, but assume that it is. Would Mr. Bryan contend that the prospect of a settlement would be improved if the disputants knew that, in their failure to agree, there were no law and no courts and no police to enforce their mutual rights and duties? In our League to Enforce Peace, there is no display of weapons by one party to the controversy against the other. The element of world force in the third article is no more obtrusive and no more provocative of temper or heat than the machinery of justice in the domestic environment of the two supposed neighbours.

There is no proof of the feasibility of Mr. Bryan's World League in his thirty treaties between other nations and the United States. Many, but not all, nations were willing to sign such treaties because they were revocable within a short period, and because they were with the United States which is notoriously unprepared for war. They would, doubtless, decline to make such an agreement with their immediate and powerful neighbors; and no such treaties have been made between other important nations. Mr. Bryan says that all nations would enter such a League if they would enter ours. On the contrary, the sanction of the world's united command in securing performance of the promises under our League will induce nations to yield their power to strike at once for their rights in the confidence that any opponent, however tricky or faithless, will not be permitted to take advantage of their concession. What the belligerent nations, in ending this war, are yearning for is a guaranty of peace, not only in the promise of each nation but in the assurance of the sanction of a superior force of all for the common good to compel observance of its promise. Mr. Bryan's proposal in this aspect would seem to them a rope of sand; and they

would have none of it as a practical object in ending the war.

Mr. Bryan thinks that the present war demonstrates the fallacy of what he calls "peace by terrorism." What the present war really demonstrates is the truth of the conclusion of Immanuel Kant, the great philosopher, that universal peace cannot be expected until the world is *politically organized,* that is, until the nations of the world use the prestige and force of all for the common good to suppress disturbers of peace. The League to Enforce Peace, if it becomes an accomplished fact, will be a step in *this world political organization.*

Mr. Bryan's League would be nothing but a series of treaties between "couples" of nations. If two nations fell out, the nations of the world other than the disputants, would have no active function except to watch the two quarrelling nations keep or break their promise to wait a year. There would be no *"political organization"* of the world to preserve and secure peace. Our League makes every member active and selfishly interested in maintaining peace to escape the burden of acting as policeman. Thus we have the "team work" of the world.

Mr. Bryan's Fifth Argument

Does the Platform of the League to Enforce Peace Furnish the Most Practical Plan for Securing Permanent Peace After the End of the Present War?

AS, under the rules governing this discussion, I am not permitted to present in the sixth article any new matter relating to plans more practical than that presented by the League to Enforce Peace, I shall at this time submit three plans for consideration, which, in my judgment, will be more effective in preventing wars for the future.

First: A court in which all the nations will be represented, and from which commissions of convenient size will be formed, from time to time, to hear and report to the full court on disputes submitted, for final arbitration in justiciable cases, and for full investigation in cases not justiciable, the findings of the court to rest upon their merit and be enforceable only by the nations which are

parties to the dispute. This would not make war *impossible;* but it would so greatly lessen the probability of war as to constitute a great advance. If the nations agreed to such a plan, the chances against war would be a hundred to one, if not a thousand to one. The League's plan to add the use of *force* by the rest of the group against any contracting nation that refused to submit its controversy to investigation, while *seeming* to go farther in the direction of peace, really weakens the plan instead of strengthening it because it invokes the principle of coercion which carries with it the cultivation of the military spirit and reliance upon a display of force, both of which are destructive of the disposition to conciliate and persuade.

Second: *A referendum on war,* except in case of actual invasion. Nothing would more surely lessen the probability of war than the inauguration of a world-wide system requiring the consent of the people who, in case of war, must furnish the blood needed and pay the taxes that follow in the wake of war. There is an increasing tendency to refer questions to the voters for their decision —what question more imperatively demands a popular vote?

In the formation of our Constitution the power to declare war was lodged in Congress, the most popular body created by the Constitution; but now that this new and more popular piece of machinery, the referendum, has been devised, it should be applied to the most vital of questions.

If the United States will take the lead in such a movement it will, by its example, render the oppressed people of other countries more service than it can possibly render by encouraging them to rely in the future, as in the past, upon military alliances which invite intrigue and secret combinations.

Third: The reduction of armaments. As the "pistol toting" man is a menace to the peace of his community, so the policy of pistol toting among nations is a menace to the peace of the world. And just as the carrying of a revolver leads one to rely upon it, to develop the disposition to use it and to provoke the use of it by others, so the building up of enormous military and naval establishments surrounds national capitols with a coterie of professional soldiers, trained in the polite art of taking human life, who, knowing no other way of settling difficulties, make it their business to imperil peace. They are the recipients

of social attentions denied to officials of equal ability and learning connected with the departments of justice, commerce, agriculture and labour. They enjoy comfortable salaries and hold office for life; they are a favoured class, petted and fêted—no wonder they grow bold and assume to set up sham standards of honour for their government and to prescribe the amount of preparation necessary to make their nation "respectable" from a military point of view.

But, while the taxes which they recommend are burdensome, the unnecessary load which they would bind upon the backs of the toilers, grievous as it is, is less harmful than the false doctrine which they teach. Their philosophy gives a threatening tone to diplomacy and magnifies trifling disputes. It keeps countries in controversy, and, by stimulating rivalry in preparation for emergencies which are always visible to the military eye, arouses suspicions and fans the hatreds out of which wars grow.

The militarist is chief assistant to the trafficker in war material; he is the architect who dreams the scares which, translated into law, give fame and fortune to the manufacturers of ships, guns and munitions.

The militarists of all countries are alike; they receive their instruction from the same books. The art of war has not materially changed in principle since the days of the Roman Empire; all teaching, training and preparation has for its object the doing of the greatest damage possible in the shortest time possible and at the least cost possible. The plans of militarists, no matter where or by whom drawn, give no intimation that nineteen hundred years ago a Prince of Peace brought into the world a gospel of love which is destined to banish from the earth the old system built upon force and intended to excite fear.

It is the old system upon which the League to Enforce Peace asks us to rely. It would fix a *minimum* for armaments; why not a maximum instead of a minimum? Why not "lay the axe at the root of the tree," instead of applying fertilizer?

Laws forbidding the carrying of concealed weapons have greatly lessened shooting scrapes among individuals—why not try the effect of the same principle among nations?

To recapitulate: To the treaty plan, suggested in the fourth argument of this debate, I would add the international court to which all would con-

tribute their wisdom without obligating themselves to enforce the decrees; a referendum on war, except in case of actual invasion; and a reduction in armaments. These plans are more practical because built upon love—the only irresistible power working among men.

Mr. Taft's Sixth Argument

Does the Platform of the League to Enforce Peace Furnish the Most Practical Plan for Securing Permanent Peace After the End of the Present War?

MR. Bryan proposes four plans which he thinks more practical than that of our League. The first one I have considered in my last argument.

The second is a World Court, in which all nations are to be represented, to consider and decide justiciable issues, and to investigate and make findings on non-justiciable issues, the judgment or finding to be enforceable only by the parties. This is similar to the first two proposals of our League, with the force article left out. There is no sanction, beyond its agreement, that any nation will delay hostilities until hearing and judgment. It does not differ from Mr. Bryan's first proposal except that his tribunal gives a decision here; and, in his first, it did not. This is an improvement; but, with that exception, it is open

to the same objections. It lacks the essential quality of world organization and pressure for peace. It is a mere combination of separate treaties of arbitration between every two nations. This suggestion of force adds nothing. The optional use of force by one party to an arbitration to compel performance by the other of an award would be implied. Mr. Bryan says, "If the nations agreed to such a plan, the chances against war would be a hundred to one, if not a thousand to one." Mr. Bryan's "If" is a formidable obstacle. The view of both the Allies and the Central Powers, shown in the peace correspondence, is clear. They both demand sanctions of force. Germany will enter a League to suppress disturbers of peace. The Allies declare in favor of "international agreements implying the sanctions necessary to insure their execution and thus prevent an apparent security from only facilitating new aggressions." Lloyd George in his Guildhall speech on January 11th, said: "The peace and security for peace will be that the nations will band themselves together to punish the first peace breaker who comes out. As to the armies of Europe, every weapon will be a sword of justice in the Government of men; every arm will be a constabulary of peace."

At the end of the war, the parties to the settlement must be given confidence that it will secure them against war. Effective guaranties are what they will seek. Mr. Bryan's second plan offers none.

Mr. Bryan's third plan is that all the nations shall agree to a referendum before declaring war. Mr. Bryan can hardly think that the great powers, Russia, Germany, France, England, Austria, Japan and Italy, or any of them, whose consent is necessary to form an effective League, would agree not to begin a war until the question should be left to a vote of their respective electorates and an affirmative vote given. If not, his proposal is not feasible. Suppose the electorate of one country decided for war and that of the other does not. Shall another vote be taken? In which country? Or shall it be in both? The difficulty in answering these questions shows how chimerical the proposal is, and how ill adapted to the settlement of a pressing international issue between two governments. The Federal Constitution gives to Congress the power to declare war. Without amendment, Mr. Bryan's proposal could not be seriously entertained. Such an amendment is not likely before this war ends.

As a fourth plan, Mr. Bryan suggests a reduction of armaments. We all strongly favour this. But Mr. Bryan offers no plan for securing and maintaining the reduction. Until all nations strongly-armed reduce, every wise nation will insist on providing and maintaining an armament enabling it to make effective defence against the possible unlawful aggression of any other armed nation. A general reduction of armaments is entirely impractical under a League, unless the League offers to each country a security of peace equivalent to the armament it abandons. I have already pointed out that Germany has expressed a willingness to consent to a limitation of armament. The Allies, in their answer to President Wilson, have intimated that agreements as to armament should be one of the sanctions of a secure peace. How is the reduction to be continuously maintained unless by the united and enforceable command of all the members of the League? An agreed reduction of armament is a corollary to our League's proposals, because a world compact embodying them will furnish the security to each nation it requires, and justify a lessening of its self-protection. But Mr. Bryan suggests no such security.

Mr. Bryan, irrelevantly, as it seems to me, charges that all army and navy officers, including our own, "make it their business to imperil peace." This is prompted by their insistence on due preparedness. Applied to our officers, it is a grave injustice to a fine body of men, fully imbued with the true American spirit of subordination of the military to the civil. If war were to come, our sudden sense of dependence on their tried skill, courage and high patriotism would cause us deep humiliation for such words, uttered merely because they had warned their countrymen truly.

The practical advantage of the League is in its organizing the political, economic and military forces of the world to command resort to impartial tribunals for the decision and settlement of all irritating questions between nations before they begin war. The educational effect of this practice will accustom them to such a mode of settlement.

They will acquire the habit of arbitration as Canada and the United States have done. The sanction of world force, though present, will thus become less compulsive upon the nations; and they will, as a matter of due course, as a habit and by preference, seek only a peaceful forum.

Mr. Bryan's Sixth Argument

Does the Platform of the League to Enforce Peace Furnish the Most Practical Plan for Securing Permanent Peace After the End of the Present War?

MR. Taft's fifth argument proves the value of joint discussions; they compel comparisons; and comparisons, however odious they may sometimes be, aid the understanding. In presenting the arguments in favor of the League's plan, it has not heretofore been necessary for its advocates to oppose the peace treaty plan. On the contrary, Mr. Taft went so far as to embody its chief feature in two treaties which he endeavored, when President, to negotiate with Great Britain and France, but which failed because the Senate made objection, not to this, but to other provisions.

Mr. Taft and his associates in the League to Enforce Peace have even made the treaty plan the basis of the League's plan. It is this very "investigation in all cases" that the League would compel by the united arms of the League na-

tions. It does not propose to enforce *acceptance of the findings* of the court or commission; its only concern is in forcing the contracting nations to *submit* their controversies to an international tribunal of investigation and report.

And yet, when I propose this plan as a substitute for his and commend it as a long step towards universal peace, he turns upon it and would rend it in pieces. "There is no proof," he says "of the feasibility of Mr. Bryan's world league in his thirty treaties between other nations and the United States." And why? Because, according to Mr. Taft's view, they were willing to make treaties with us because we are "notoriously unprepared for war." Here, if I may be pardoned for saying so, he contradicts himself. Our unpreparedness should, according to his logic, prevent the making of such treaties with us. If Force is the vital principle to be invoked between nations, our lack of preparedness should put us at a disadvantage and make it impossible to negotiate treaties like we now have. Why, according to the terrorists, should any nation go to the trouble of making treaties with us unless it is afraid of us?

But instead of having this effect, our weakness

(from the militarist's point of view) seems to be our strength. Mr. Taft ventures to express the opinion that the nations that have made treaties with us would doubtless decline to make such an agreement with their immediate and powerful neighbours.

The thirty treaties providing for an investigation of all disputes received the unanimous endorsement of the United States Senate, not a vote being cast in opposition after the ratification of the third treaty; only five were cast against the first.

If the plan of these treaties is of so little merit, why bring the nations together into a league to force submission of disputes for investigation only, without any thought of compelling an acceptance of the results of the investigation?

Mr. Taft has several times used the policeman as an illustration—it is a "world police force" that the League desires to establish. It is worth while to note the fallacy involved in the illustration. An apt illustration is a powerful argument; but nothing is more misleading than an illustration that does not illustrate.

The nations cannot, in fairness, be likened to criminals, although we often describe their public

acts as criminal, especially in time of war. The criminal is one who intentionally violates a law, duly enacted by those having authority to make laws. He disregards an obligation confessedly binding upon him; and the policeman, acting for the outraged community, arrests the guilty party and brings him before the bar of justice.

There is no international law-making power; and, if such a law-making power existed, there are certain questions upon which it would not assume to act—certain questions which each nation, whether large or small, is conceded the right to decide for itself without regard to the views or interests of other nations. Our arbitration treaties, the most advanced in the world, contain four exceptions; questions of honour, questions of independence, vital interests, and the interests of third parties. These questions are not to be submitted to arbitration; and yet these are the very questions out of which wars grow. The League to Enforce Peace, recognizes the distinction—the force proposed is not to be exerted to compel acceptance of an award, but simply to compel the submission of the dispute to an international tribunal for investigation.

Then, too, the individual criminal is, as a

rule, a man without standing or influence in his community, while in international affairs it is the big nations, not the little ones, that make trouble. If the League proposed to deal only with violations of universally-accepted laws by individual law-breakers, like piracy, for instance, it would be a different matter; but it proposes to deal with sovereign and independent nations as if they were ordinary criminals; and it proposes to deal with undefined and, thus far, indefinable offences as if they were violations of statute law.

The League's diagnosis of the disease is faulty; it has not found the seat of the trouble. The real difficulty with Europe is that the governments reject the moral standards that regulate individual life. And, since there is no moral standard except that to which individuals conform, there is no international standard of morals. There is neither a system of international law nor an accepted international code of ethics enforcible by common agreement and united action. And, what is worse, there cannot be as long as the European nations cling to the doctrine that conquest is a legitimate basis upon which to erect a government's claim to authority. As long as European nations assert the right to throw a government, like a net, over

helpless people and then compel obedience to foreign-made laws, just so long will it be impossible to enforce peace by a league of nations. Their commercial rivalries will involve them in disputes which, because they rest on pecuniary interest, will lead them into wars; and other nations, not pecuniarily interested, cannot afford to share the sacrifices for which such wars will call. The treaty plan will, in my judgment, do more than the League's plan to reduce the probability of war because it seeks to substitute persuasion for force and the spirit of co-operation for the spirit of combat.

TOPIC NUMBER THREE

SHOULD THE UNITED STATES BECOME A SIGNATORY TO THE LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE?

Mr. Taft's Seventh Argument

Should the United States Become a Signatory to the League to Enforce Peace?

IF, after the war, a League of the Great Powers to Enforce Peace is not formed, the only alternative is the separate leagues like these now fighting. The Allies and the Central Powers will maintain their offensive and defensive alliances as a matter of self-defence. A peace ending thus will merely postpone a renewal of the struggle. While all sides favour a single World League, a difference will arise in uniting friendly co-operation of nations so lately engaged as enemies. To give confidence in the fair operation of such a League, the leadership of a nation indifferent between the belligerents and with no ulterior motive is indispensable.

The position of our country is unique. We are the most powerful nation in the world with one hundred millions of people, of the highest average of intelligence, of great homogeneity and solidar-

ity, and with greater wealth and greater variety of resources than any other nation.

The war in Europe will have weakened all nations engaged in it by the loss of the flower of their youth and by the destruction of industries and homes in the thousands of miles in its train, the cost of the rehabilitation of which can hardly be measured. The belligerents will stagger under a stupendous debt and interest charge. The primacy of the United States among the nations of the world will thus become clearer than it ever was; and this, taken with its real neutrality, must give it a great influence in a council of nations which can and ought to be exerted for the world's benefit. Its advocacy of such a League will strongly make for its acceptance by the other great powers, but only on condition that it becomes a member and bears its share of the risk and receives its share of the benefit of membership.

Our wealth in the last three years has been added to by billions in the profits that have been reaped from the sale of war material and war equipment to the nations of Europe and thus from the blood and the suffering of the people of these stricken countries. We had the right to take advantage of the situation for which we were not

responsible; but the fact should make us sensitive to our duty when occasion and opportunity arise for us to help our brethren of Europe to avoid a recurrence of such woe. We have been blessed beyond any other nation. Our good fortune seems to have no limit. We shall not be worthy of it unless we recognize our responsibility and run our share of risk in securing the world from the scourge visiting it now. Of course, the first duty of a nation is to its own people and to itself; and it should not, out of a mere ideal of self-sacrifice, endanger the integrity of its government or its civilization. But it has a duty as a member of the family of nations; and that duty is commensurate with its power for good to the world.

Moreover the risk which the United States would run in joining such a League should not be exaggerated. If the United States makes adequate preparation, as it intends to do, to defend itself against the unlawful aggression of any nation, the army and navy which it has projected will furnish ample constabulary force to fill any quota which may be allotted to it in the formation of the world police to suppress the beginnings of war in violation of the regulations of the League. To show the danger that the United States would run

in such a League, the hypothetical case has been put of Russia and Japan, members of the League, quarrelling over a question in Manchuria. Russia refuses to submit the question in accordance with its obligation and begins hostilities against Japan. It is said the United States must then send an army and a navy to aid Japan in resisting the Russian assault for a matter in which it has no interest. Its lack of interest may be questioned. The nations of the world are now so knit together by interests spread all over the world that a war begun anywhere is likely to concern them all and ultimately to involve them all, unless the war is hedged about and promptly restrained. We began war against Spain in Cuba; and within a month, we found ourselves half-way round the globe battering the Spanish fleet at Manila. But in case Russia violated her promise and attacked Japan, not only would the United States send its military and naval forces but so also would England and Germany and France and Austria and Italy, to assist Japan. With the certainty of encountering defeat from such enormous force against her, is it likely that Russia would violate her obligation? In other words, will not the potential and certain organization of the world

police render its use unnecessary? Is not the risk that the United States would be exposed to by such a call therefore less burdensome than has been urged? And is it not one which with the thought of the good we may work for the world we ought to assume?

In the preliminary conference as to the proposals of the League, one member present put a question to another: Would you be willing that your boy, the apple of your eye and the pride of your heart, should lay down his life in a struggle over a question between Servia and Austria in which America has no concern? The answer was: "If the suppression of that struggle by the police force of the world would prevent a spread of the local fire into a general world conflagration, my boy's life could not be sacrificed in a higher cause." It is the duty of the United States, in its own interest and in the interest of mankind, to lead the nations into a League to Enforce Peace.

Mr. Bryan's Seventh Argument

Should the United States Become a Signatory to the League to Enforce Peace?

WE are now ready to consider the objections to the plan of the League to Enforce Peace, viewed from an American standpoint.

"Should the United States become a signatory to the League to Enforce Peace?" No. In addition to the reasons that should restrain European nations from joining such a League, there are several which combine to make such a plan much more objectionable to us than to the nations across the Atlantic. Two of these reasons will be presented in this argument.

First: To join in such a plan would be a repudiation of the teachings of Washington and Jefferson and a revolutionary change in our international policy. The former in his farewell address said: "The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little

political connection as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop."

"Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none, or a very remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, *it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificialities, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities.*" . . .

"Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? *Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice?*"

The latter, in his first inaugural address, commended the same course when he advised: "Peace, commerce and honest friendship with all nations, *entangling alliances with none.*"

Were these men—one "The Father of his Country," the other, the Author of the Declaration of Independence—wise or unwise? And, if

their position was sound then, is it unsound now? What change has taken place in the *facts* to justify a change in policy?

Are the "friendships and enmities" of the nations of Europe any less pronounced than they were in the days of Washington? The present war furnishes a conclusive answer. Never have friendships been more costly or enmities more bitter. Never have the European nations been more ambitious, rivalries more keen, or caprice more capricious.

This nation is more distinctly different from Europe to-day than it was a century ago. Then, we had just ceased to be a British colony; and nearly all of our people traced their ancestry to one country. Now, we are the most composite nation in the world, with a population made up of the descendants of all the European nations, the largest percentage, it so happens, being from the two great nations now principals in a struggle more desperate than either has ever known before. We could not take part in a European war—no matter which group we aided—without dividing our people into hostile factions, so embittered against each other as to seriously interfere with the calm consideration of domestic questions.

One has only to understand the antagonisms aroused in this country by the incidents of the present war to appreciate the conditions which would exist if we were actually at war with either Great Britain or Germany. I shall discuss later the moral wrong we would do the world by surrendering priceless advantage of isolation: for the present I point out the wrong we would do ourselves if we were foolish enough to forsake the counsels of the revolutionary patriots.

Second: We could not hope to keep Europe out of Western Hemisphere politics, if we attempted forcible interference in the politics of Europe. We must, therefore, be prepared to surrender the Monroe Doctrine, also, if we join the League to Enforce Peace. It is possible, of course, that the European nations might be so anxious to throw upon us the pecuniary burden of keeping the peace of the whole world that they would allow us to do all the fighting on this side of the Atlantic in return for our willingness to share with them the blood and expense of European wars; but it is not likely. It would wound their pride to admit that we were big enough to be dominant in the West and a full partner in the East. The League's plan, so far

as I have seen, does not consider this contingency; it contains no clause designed to protect the Monroe Doctrine.

And what would its surrender mean? It would mean the exploiting of Central and South America; republics would be converted into colonies; grievances would be settled by the seizing of harbours; fancied insults would have their price fixed in coaling stations; and commercialism would, by its rapacity, lay the foundation for new wars.

For more than a hundred years we have saved Latin-America the expense of armies and navies; and we have at the same time protected ourselves from the menace of monarchies; and now, just as our sister republics are convinced of the benevolence of our purpose and are willing to join in defending the Monroe Doctrine as a Western Hemisphere law, we are asked to put it in jeopardy in return for the expensive privilege of entering the old world cock-pit.

We cannot plead either duty or interest as an excuse. If we are compelled to give a reason, why not give the real one, namely, the feeling that we must do like the other nations in order to show that we are grown up—the "I'm getting a big boy now" feeling.

But the price is too high. We cannot afford to exchange the moral prestige of this republic for the martial glory of all the empires that have risen and fallen since time began.

Mr. Taft's Eighth Argument

Should the United States Become a Signatory to the League to Enforce Peace?

WASHINGTON'S advice has no application to the League. The alliances which he condemned were like that with France during the Revolution in which we were called on to serve the selfish motive of our ally. Jefferson advocated a permanent alliance with Great Britain to maintain the Monroe Doctrine. Our League is a League of all nations to support the selfish purposes of none. It has only one object and that to prevent unnecessary wars.

Moreover the contrast between then and now makes Washington's words irrelevant. Then we were four millions of people with fifteen sparsely populated states on the Atlantic. We were five times as far from Europe as we are to-day in speed of transportation, with no means of communication save by mail. We had no relations with Asia.

Now we are more than one hundred millions of people between the two oceans and between Canada and the Gulf, with three great states on the Pacific and facing Asia. Alaska, with its wide wealth-producing domain, makes us a neighbour of Russia and Japan; while the Hawaiian Islands, two thousand miles out in the Pacific, give us an outpost for the Panama Canal. The Philippine Islands, with 140,000 square miles and eight millions of people, to whom we owe protection, make us an Asiatic power. The Panama Canal, in the northwest corner of South America, for which we paid $400,000,000, and have guaranteed the integrity of the Republic of Panama, aiding as it does the trade between our eastern and western seaboards and adding much to the efficiency of our navy, it is in our highest interest to defend. Porto Rico, 1200 miles southeast of Florida, with a million inhabitants to whom we owe protection, makes us a West Indian power. Our guaranty of Cuba's integrity, our supervision of her foreign affairs, and our obligation and power to maintain peace and order there, make her, with her elements of instability, a greater liability than if we owned her. Mexico, an anarchical and threatening nuisance, furnishes our enemies opportunity

for attack. The Monroe Doctrine rests ultimately on force. The traditions of ninety-three years strengthen it; but the Zimmermann note advises us that they may not be sufficient. Indeed our interests the world over require us to protect and maintain them. The enormous trade that we have with all the countries of Europe makes it most difficult in a European war to preserve our rights and interests as neutrals, and is most likely to involve us. President Wilson says there will be no neutrals in the next war. We are now on the brink of hostilities with Germany in this. Why then should Washington's advice be controlling, given us in a day of small things, based on an isolation and a remoteness from the rest of the world which has ceased to be? Our coming war with Germany demonstrates, from the selfish point of view alone the wisdom of our joining in a world movement to prevent the recurrence of another European war, even though it imposes on us the burden of contributing a quota to an international police force.

But Mr. Bryan says that in joining the League we would abandon the Monroe Doctrine. The Monroe Doctrine shortly described is our national policy of preventing, by protest and by force if

necessary, any non-American power from subverting any independent American government and from colonizing, by such means or by purchase, American territory under a government of its own. Our reason is that we think such a course would endanger our interests. The Doctrine does not rest on International Law. Should a question arise as to its enforcement between us and a non-American power, therefore, it would be non-justiciable and must go to the Commission under the second article for a recommendation of compromise in which we would not be bound in honour to acquiesce. We would then have the same opportunity to maintain the Doctrine by force as if there were no League. Under the thirty treaties of Mr. Bryan, we would now have to abide a year of investigation before using force. The disadvantage to us, if any, of delay, therefore, will be no greater under the terms of the League.

Instead of hampering our maintenance of the Doctrine, the League would help us in any case where its violation might be attempted for by the terms of the League, the non-American power must submit its cause for hearing to one of the Tribunals of the League before hostilities; and, if it failed to do so, we could summon the Interna-

tional Police Force to drive it off American shores.

But it is said that, if we mix in European politics to the extent required by this League, we cannot exclude European powers from taking part in those of this hemisphere. There is nothing in the League requiring us or authorizing us to participate in the internal politics of any European country or to do other than to use our good offices to prevent a war between any two of such countries. We are to furnish our quota to suppress a premature war between them. They are to exercise the same functions in this hemisphere. In what respect does that violate the Monroe Doctrine? The League does not enable us or authorize us to acquire and colonize territory in Europe by purchase or conquest any more than it authorizes a European nation to do so on this side; and that is all the Monroe Doctrine forbids.

Mr. Bryan suggests that we should not join a World League because our citizens of foreign nativity would divide in their sympathies as between European nations. If our foreign policies needed for our protection and for that of the world are to be abandoned because of race prejudice in a comparatively-small group of our for-

eign-born citizens, we have failed in our experiment of naturalisation. I cannot acquiesce in such a view. This would indeed be a humiliating surrender to the so-called "hyphen."

Mr. Bryan's Eighth Argument

Should the United States Become a Signatory to the League to Enforce Peace?

SINCE the preceding articles were written, the President has sent to the belligerent nations the message read to the United States Senate on January 22nd. It is an heroic and epoch-making document. In this message he suggests terms for a peace which he believes the American people would be willing to guarantee by agreement with the nations of Europe. Separating the suggested terms from the proposed guaranty, I can most heartily commend the basis upon which the President would construct a peace between the nations now at war. It is the only basis that gives promise of permanence. More than a year and a half ago, I ventured to outline our nation's duty toward the belligerents as follows: "If this nation has any influence, that influence must be exerted to bring the warring nations together and not to encourage them in the false hope that a permanent peace

can be built on force or fear." When the President declares that a peace to be lasting "must be a peace without a victory" he sets forth an essential condition, however unpleasant that philosophy may be to those who, accustomed to think in terms of force, have not considered the greater power of love. What the world needs is not a despot to fix the terms upon which the rest shall live: it's great need is that the nations now engaged in unparalleled slaughter shall be brought together in a spirit of friendship and fellowship that they may co-operate in working out the destiny of Europe. The peace of Europe can neither be gained nor preserved by the sword. The saying "Speak softly but carry a big stick" may be witty; but it is not statesmanship. The man who speaks softly does not need a big stick; and, if he yields to temptation and equips himself with one, the tone of his voice is very likely to change.

The President is wise in urging that nations shall be recognised as equal in rights, without regard to territory or population; he is right also in contending for "the freedom of the seas" and in presenting, as a condition precedent to permanent peace, the doctrine of government by consent of the governed. This is fundamental. As

long as the people can be called into battle at the will of rulers—without any voice in deciding upon the necessity for the war,—so long will the ambitions of monarchs, the greed of commercial interest and the false standards of professional soldiers prevail over the common sense and the common welfare of the masses. And it is necessary that the theory of "government by the consent of the governed" shall be put into actual practice. It is not sufficient that it be preached in the abstract. It must be applied. It is with this in view that I have, in a previous article, proposed a referendum on war, except IN CASE OF ACTUAL INVASION.

If the belligerent nations are willing to accept the President's advice and come together in the spirit of friendship and co-operation, a League to Enforce Peace will not be necessary. Even more, the formation of such a league would suggest a lack of confidence in the good faith of the contracting parties; and our participation in such league would, in my judgment, be more apt to jeopardise peace than to give stability to it.

It would not only encourage reliance upon force instead of persuasion and conciliation; but it might excite a desire among European nations to use the

military and naval strength of the United States for selfish purposes.

While, in diplomatic discussions, it is proper to assume that all nations will act fairly and impartially in all matters; yet we know that, as a matter of fact, monarchs and their advisers are human and that they exhibit all the frailties of the flesh. In addition to the selfish influences that act upon the rulers of republics, the monarchial rulers have their kingly prerogatives to guard, their imperial fortunes to protect and their royal relationship to consider. And the situation is still further complicated by commercial connections and by the overshadowing influence of the military groups that make their home in European capitols.

We could not expect to dominate such a council as that which would direct the activities of a League to Enforce Peace. To become a member of such a council, therefore, would commit us in advance to any course that the council might adopt and thus put our army and navy under the command of foreign generals and admirals. It is inconceivable that the toiling millions of the United States should place their destiny in the hands of aliens and agree to furnish blood and money, on demand and in unlimited quantities, to settle quar-

rels between rival trade combinations, rival races, rival militarists and rival royal families. If any one ever entertained a thought of such a surrender of sovereignty the tone of the European comment on the President's eloquent appeal ought to be a sufficient warning against the dangers involved.

The President's message has emphasised another objection to the proposed "Entangling Alliance," namely, that it involves a large increase in expenditures on the army and navy and consequent increase in taxation, not to speak of the increasing menace of militarism.

Ex-Secretary Root, in commending the plan of the League to Enforce Peace, advocated universal military training and universal military service. If we become so Europeanised as to desire to mingle our standards with theirs on foreign battlefields, we will fall an easy victim to the disease of militarism. Our people will then be called from the field and factory to the camp, and to the excitements of the game of man-killing. What then shall save us from the fate of the long line of dead empires that, spurning the lessons of history and the promptings of man's better nature, put their faith in the omnipotence of brute force?

Mr. Taft's Ninth Argument

Should the United States Become a Signatory to the League to Enforce Peace?

MR. Bryan's eighth article commends the attitude of the President in his message read to the United States Senate on January 22nd. I have altogether misinterpreted the notes of the President to the belligerent powers, his speech at the dinner of the League to Enforce Peace in May, 1916, as well as the message of January 22nd last, if he has not, in all of these, intended to approve the general principles of our League. His reference to "the major force of the world" was certainly an approval of the political organisation of the world to the extent of creating an international police force to secure compliance with a peaceable procedure for the settlement of international questions likely otherwise to lead to war. Mr. Bryan's citation of the President as authority does not sustain his contention.

Mr. Bryan objects to the League on the ground

that an international council in which we would only have one vote could direct the activities of the League and put our army and navy under the command of foreign generals and admirals. He treats this as delegation of sovereignty. Mr. Bryan has elsewhere urged that in becoming a signatory to the League, the treaty-making power would be violating the Constitution of the United States in taking away from Congress the power to declare war. The argument of unconstitutionality and the argument of delegation of power are rested on the same misconception as to how the United States would discharge its obligation under the League. While the President and two-thirds of the Senate as the treaty-making power would bind us to the obligations of the League, these obligations must be performed in the way provided by the constitution, namely by the action of Congress. To Congress would fall the power and duty to determine whether the event had arisen imposing on the United States the task of furnishing its quota of an international police force and taking part in a campaign. Having decided in the affirmative, it would then become the duty of Congress to declare the war and to provide our quota for its conduct. We could not

be hurried into war by a council of the powers without action of Congress.

The question who shall command the joint military force in a campaign is not material, provided it be understood in advance, as it must be, what the purpose of the campaign is. The United States has had no difficulty in the past in acting with other nations to carry out a common purpose of a military character, as the taking of Pekin by the Allied force during the Boxer trouble proves. Nations have acted together often in history; and the question who should have the military command or how the joint armies should be directed is a practical military question to be agreed upon by the joint powers in war council. The purpose of League campaigns would be settled by the terms of the League before the mobilization begins. It would be to restrain the warlike activities of a nation unlawfully breaking a peace to which it is pledged. To characterise this as placing the destiny of the toiling millions of the United States in the hands of aliens for their selfish purposes is to reveal a complete misunderstanding of the normal operation of the League. The United States retains complete control of its forces and can withdraw them whenever

the lawful and commendable purpose of preserving the peace of the world shall cease to be the object of the military campaign.

Mr. Bryan objects to the League that it will involve a large increase in expenditures of the army and navy and a consequent increase in taxation. It will certainly not involve any larger increase in expenditures of the army and navy than we are now incurring. If we carry out the plans now projected in present legislation, we shall have a land force and a naval force quite large enough to enable us to meet any call likely to be made upon us in performance of our League obligations.

Of course membership in the League would require military and naval preparation by the United States; but, as we have seen, that is to follow without the League. On this point, the country has emphatically decided against Mr. Bryan's view.

Those who are promoting the League are not committed to any particular means by which the necessary military preparation shall be secured. Personally, I favor universal compulsory military training for a year, of our youth between the ages of nineteen and twenty-four, as the most effective and most democratic plan that can be adopted.

It will fall equally upon the rich and poor. It will give a year of valuable disciplinary education to our youth who need it much. It will furnish a citizenship from which we can summon a trained army to defend our country. I repeat, however, this is not a part of the League plan.

The war with Germany which we now face, after every effort to escape it and when our national conscience is wholly void of offence toward her, is a sufficient answer to Mr. Bryan's view that love is all that is needed to make effective a world league to insure peace. If this war teaches us anything, it is a demonstration that our civilisation has not advanced beyond the time when the major force of the world is sometimes needed to defend against selfish greed and ambition on the part of nations. If we fail to prepare ourselves to defend our rights against lawless aggression by ruthless military and naval power, we are blind to the simplest lessons of current history. If we can avail ourselves of the same preparation to do our part in defending the peace of the world, should we not seize the opportunity?

Mr. Bryan's Ninth Argument

Should the United States Become a Signatory to the League to Enforce Peace?

THE preceding articles have set forth the arguments pro and con. In this article, I venture to dispute Mr. Taft's conclusions. He contends that the advice of Washington has no application to such an organisation as the League to Enforce Peace; and then proceeds to argue that, even if it did apply, the advice of the first President should have no weight now because of the changed conditions.

My answer is, that the reasoning employed by Washington not only applies to the proposed League but applies with even greater force. If it is unwise to link ourselves to one nation because Europe has a set of interests different from ours, there is more reason why we should not enter into a League with all, or a large number of the nations, thus entangling ourselves with interests not only diverse but conflicting. The

dangers against which Washington so wisely warned his country have been multiplied rather than decreased.

But if Mr. Taft's logic is faulty when he argues that Washington's advice does not apply, it is still more faulty when he argues that we have outgrown the conditions to which Washington's advice applied. Mr. Taft and his associates are infected, I fear, with the spirit that is driving the Old World through slaughter to universal bankruptcy. They reject the advice of the ages and the principles which have given us our peaceful progress and our moral prestige.

The facts, which Mr. Taft presents in support of the proposition that we can no longer afford to keep out of world war, not only fail to support his position; but, from my point of view, they furnish conclusive reasons why we should adhere even more tenaciously to the policy of non-interference in European affairs. If the distance between the two hemispheres has been lessened by the use of steam, there is the more reason why we should reserve our energies for the protection of the Western Hemisphere from European exploitation. To allow the trans-Atlantic countries to assist in determining the controversies on the

American side of the Atlantic would be to invite new perils. They could not resist the temptation to claim compensation in territory.

Mr. Taft attempts to belittle the dangers by arguing that the League does not propose to settle disputes between nations but merely desires to compel the submission of such disputes to investigation. But any act that calls forth the use of force involves war; and a war once begun is not easily controlled. Human calculation can cover ordinary affairs with reasonable accuracy; but there is no system of calculation by which one can measure the possibilities when war is actually entered upon.

Take the present war, for instance. It began with a controversy between Austria and Servia over the killing of one person. The difference between the two countries did not seem to be a vital one. It was, in fact, so unimportant that Austria thought twenty-four hours sufficient time for Servia to decide whether to accept or reject its ultimatum. But this was only the match. Events showed that there was a large amount of inflammable material in the immediate neighbourhood.

A conclusive answer to all the League's arguments is furnished by the present conflict. Be-

hold, with what unanimity the belligerent powers have rejected the President's eloquent plea for "PEACE WITHOUT VICTORY." He pointed out the impossibility of building a durable peace upon military prowess—a lesson taught by the history of the world. He urged them to consider the principles essential to permanent friendship between nations. But his noble proposals were spurned in language barely courteous. We cannot afford to enter into partnership with them.

What is there in the attitude of the nations on either side to invite us into an alliance? The killing of a member of a royal family has already cost six million lives, not to speak of the wounding of ten millions more; and it has increased the war debts of the world to the extent of forty billions. Who is in a position to insure us that the next European war will have a more worthy cause or a cause which will justify this country in participating? Mr. Taft states that our country cannot hope to have influence in Europe unless it is willing to join in the use of force. His reasoning is, in my judgment, unsound. Our influence would be diminished rather than increased by a binding agreement to put our strength and resources back of an international committee, controlled by

European nations. He objects to the referendum; and, yet, in Great Britain the overthrow of a ministry may compel a submission of the issue at a special election.

If it were true, as Mr. Taft contends, that the time has come when we should actively join the European nations in the effort to compel peace, it would be much better for our nation to reserve the right to *say when* and upon what terms we should contribute our strength. If we are to undertake to finance war and to fight out European quarrels, we should, at least, wait until the issue is defined before attempting to decide its merits.

Instead of becoming a party to such a League, as Mr. Taft proposes, why not, if such be the wish of the American people, announce that it is our determination to assist in the future in the preservation of peace in Europe by joining in the punishment of any nation which resorts to war without an excuse which to us seems sufficient? I do not think such a policy wise or necessary; but it would have all the advantages conferred by membership of the proposed League without its dangers. It would not only save us from war, except when we regarded the cause of the war suf-

ficient to justify intervention; but it would cause our favour to be courted by Europe. A League to Enforce Peace would prove a menace instead of a blessing.

CONCLUDING ARGUMENT

Mr. Taft's Concluding Argument

WE have now reached the end of the discussion. This tenth article offers an opportunity for a summary of the positions taken in the previous papers. The program of the League looks to a treaty binding all nations to adopt, in the settlement of controversies likely to lead to war between them, a peaceable procedure for the hearing and decision of issues capable of being settled on principles of law and of issues that may not be so settled. It does not attempt to enforce the decisions. The aim of the League is, by elucidation of the facts and arguments on both sides of the issue and by a decision of it by an impartial tribunal, to practice nations in the art of settling irritating questions by judicial investigation and conclusion. The example of our relations with Canada and the constant use of arbitration to settle our difficulties—which has been created a habit—offer a precedent from which we believe that, when such a procedure is enforced, it will train all nations to adopt it rather than to

resort to war. The force of the world is to be used to compel nations to adopt this procedure before resorting to hostilities. This is the same principle, though not carried so far, which prevails in domestic communities, cities, states and nations. It is the plan of organising the force of all to suppress the lawless force of an individual or a group of individuals. Any one who opposes the use of force in such a World League must be logically led to deny the propriety of the use of force in a domestic community to maintain order and to preserve the law. Governmental force cannot be excluded from human affairs as long as force is used to violate the law and right. Such vicious force can only be restrained by greater force. For this, the state organizes a police and an army. So the family of nations may and should organize a police force to suppress the unlawful force of a nation. A pacifist who will admit a policeman to be a proper official in the community yields the whole case against the creation of an international police force in our League.

Mr. Bryan attempts to meet this argument in the sixth paper which I have not had an opportunity under the rules to answer until now. He

says now that the analogy is misleading and uses these words:

"The nations cannot, in fairness, be likened to criminals, although we often describe their public acts as criminal, especially in time of war. The criminal is one who intentionally violates a law duly enacted by those having authority to make laws. He disregards an obligation confessedly binding upon him; and the policeman, acting for the outraged community, arrests the guilty party and brings him before the bar of justice. There is no international law-making power; and, if such a law-making power existed, there are certain questions upon which it would not assume to act—certain questions upon which each nation, whether large or small, is conceded the right to decide for itself without regard to the views or interests of other nations. Our arbitration treaties, the most advanced in the world, contain exceptions, questions of honour, questions of independence, vital interests and the interests of third parties. These questions are not to be submitted to arbitration; and yet these are the very questions out of which wars grow."

Of all men in the world, Mr. Bryan, by reason of his general views, is the one least entitled to put forth these reasons in order to escape the

analogy of state police. No one has spoken more eloquently against war as a crime than Mr. Bryan. No one has upheld more fully international law as a binding force upon the nations. International law is the law of nations agreed to between the nations and deriving its sanction from their general acquiescence. A nation which violates international law is a criminal before the bar. The exceptions from our existing treaties of arbitration of questions of vital interest and national honour, to which Mr. Bryan refers, were exceptions which were not recognized in the unratified general arbitration treaties made with France and Great Britain which Mr. Bryan approved and to which he gave effective support. More than that, the Senate itself did not seek, in its proposed amendments, to except questions of honour and vital interest from arbitration. Mr. Bryan's distinction is a forced one and has no foundation, certainly as applied to the plan of the League to Enforce Peace. The treaty forming the League is an agreement by all nations to comply with its stipulations and not only to comply with its stipulations, but, in case of non-compliance by any member to contribute their quotas to an international police to restrain and punish that member for

non-compliance. In other words, it furnishes an international constitution. It creates an international law and denounces as a crime violation of the legal obligations into which the nations voluntarily enter. The very object of the League is to organize the world politically; and that means to enact law and to provide for its enforcement. I submit that the analogy of the state police is not only a fair one but a clinching and convincing one in showing the fundamental fallacy and error of those who have the international pacifist views of Mr. Bryan and still are in favour of a state and city police.

That the League is practical may be inferred from the approval which its general principles have received from the leading statesmen of the Great Powers in answer to direct questions upon the subject, and also in official expression in the correspondence between President Wilson and the belligerent powers engaged in the present war. It is practical because there is precedent for every detail in the League, and because it embodies the elemental principle of government as it should be in city, state, and nation and in the world: to wit, the organization of the force of all to suppress lawless force of the few. The lines upon

which the League has been framed are very general; the plan is only a working hypothesis. That it may be changed in international conference in detail goes without saying. But that it furnishes broad and correct foundation for the political organization of the world, as Kant foresaw it, I submit is clear.

The United States should enter the League; first, because of all nations in the world, it wishes to avoid war and to make it as remote as possible; second, because its interests have now become so world-wide, and it has become so close a neighbour of all the great powers of Europe and of Asia that a general war must involve the United States. It is therefore of the highest importance to the United States in a selfish view to secure the joint effort of the world to prevent such a war or to confine it to a local struggle. The present difficulty with Germany is a most speaking demonstration of the danger in which the United States will be involved in every general war in the future, struggle as it may to escape being drawn in.

The objection, that by such a League as this the United States will have to abandon the Monroe Doctrine, is entirely unfounded. On the contrary, the League will assist the United States in main-

taining that Doctrine by invoking the action of the world to hold off its violation by a European nation's making war against an American country until after a hearing and decision on the merits of the controversy. Nor will it commit the United States to any judgment in respect to the Doctrine, because, under the League, it is not the subject matter of a judgment, but only of a recommendation of a compromise which the United States is at liberty to accept or reject. The League offers no authority or opportunity to European nations to subvert American governments or colonize American territory, any more than it offers to the United States corresponding authority or opportunity for similar action in Europe.

Nor does the League involve the delegation to an international council, in which the United States has but one vote, the power to hurry this country into war. The President and the Senate sign the treaty of the League and bind the United States to its obligations. Congress is the authority which will decide whether the fact exists, calling for action by the United States, and then will take such action as the obligation requires. Should the purpose of the International Police under the League be perverted to anything other than en-

forcing the peaceable procedure in the settlement of international controversies, Congress will have full power to withdraw the United States forces and decline further to take part in the proceedings.

It is the duty of the United States, as potentially the leading power of the world, to bring about an international arrangement to make war less probable. The war and the weakening of the European countries have increased the primacy and influence of the United States if properly exercised. It is doubtful whether such a League can be formed unless the United States, with its power and its position of indifference to the jealousies and local interest of Europe and of Asia, does not become active in its advocacy and formation. The United States should take its full part of the responsibility for the peace of the world even though it involves some risk in doing so. The burden of preparation which it would have to assume in this regard, however, would not exceed that which it owes to itself in military and naval preparation for reasonable defence and the maintenance of its international rights, even if no League were formed. With the blessings which God has showered on this country, it should not hesitate to help

the world and the family of nations to protect itself against the recurrence of such an awful disaster and retrograde movement in Christian civilization as the present war.

Mr. Bryan's Concluding Argument

THIS, the last argument of the series, is intended for recapitulation. The objections to the plan of the League to Enforce Peace are:

First, That it would necessitate a departure from the advice of the fathers and a change in our national policy—a change which would not only deprive us of the security which we have enjoyed, but would inevitably entangle us in the numerous and varied disputes of the old world.

Second, It would virtually compel a surrender of the Monroe Doctrine because we could not expect to take part in the settlement of European quarrels and at the same time exclude European nations from participation in the settlement of international disputes in the Western hemisphere.

Third, It would virtually be a surrender by Congress of the right to declare war and a delegation of that authority to a council controlled by European nations. In his ninth argument, Mr. Taft attempts to avoid this conclusion by arguing that Congress would have to act affirmatively in each

case before our aid would be given. The action of Congress would, however, be a mere formality. If we enter into an agreement to join other nations in compelling a submission of every question to investigation, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to excuse ourselves from responding to a call when made. Mr. Taft would doubtless admit that he would regard it as a breach of faith for the United States to fail to respond after having pledged itself to furnish its quota.

Fourth, The League's plan substitutes physical force for moral influence; and this is a step down from the position which we have heretofore occupied. While this may seem sentimental, I venture to present it as a substantial objection. With a nation, as with the individual, the idea is vital and controls destiny. If an individual depends upon the exercise of physical force for his influence in a community, he must content himself with the inferior position awarded to men of his class. He may excite fear; but he cannot win respect.

If, however, he relies upon character and service, he will command not only confidence but increasing consideration and influence. So with the nation; if it chooses to rely upon the weapons of physical warfare, it must be content to be feared.

It can not hope to be loved. And such a nation can hardly be expected to estimate its greatness in terms of world service.

Our nation has for a century been inspired by an honourable ambition to conquer with its ideals rather than with its arms; and it has rejoiced to see its political principles making progress throughout the world. Within a decade China, the sleeping giant of the Orient, has aroused itself. Breaking off its monarchial fetters, it has declared itself a republic; and, passing over imperial designations, it has honoured our nation by giving to its chief executive, the title President. We could never have won such a triumph by the employment of force.

Within the last few days Russia, the largest European nation when measured by population or territory, has overthrown its arbitrary government and commenced to build a national authority upon popular consent. Surely the American people, believing as they do in free institutions, must find great satisfaction in the increasing influence exerted by our example. Shall we exchange our moral prestige for the tinsel glory of military power?

And is not our religion involved? However

belligerent one may become in hours of excitement, he cannot, in his calmer moments, fail to understand the difference between the teachings of Christ and the threatenings of a League whose "vital principle is force." When appeals are made for the application of Christian principles to government, the usual answer is that we cannot afford to adjust our governmental methods to the teachings of the New Testament until other nations are ready to do so; but this rejoinder entirely overlooks the basic principle of Christianity, namely, that its truths are to be propagated by example.

Our religion would have never made progress if each individual had waited for other individuals to join him before putting Christ's philosophy into practice. And so the application of Christianity to government must be postponed indefinitely if each nation waits for other nations to join it. Nations have not hesitated to make war alone. Why should they hesitate to act alone in putting God's truth to the test? Why not try the international value of a philosophy that has established peace between individuals wherever applied?

As a substitute for the League's plan, I have proposed; First, the plan of separate treaties be-

tween the nations, such as we now have with thirty nations, providing for investigations of *all disputes;* Second, the establishing of an international court, which will give expression to the universal sense of justice, leaving the decision to be accepted upon its merits, or to be enforced by the nations immediately concerned; Third, provision for a referendum on war, except in case of actual invasion; Fourth, the reduction of armaments. In my ninth argument, I suggested a fifth plan which I do not deem necessary, but which is much to be preferred to the League's plan; namely, the announcement of an *intention* to take part in future wars *when the excuse for the war is such as to commend itself to our nation,* the sufficiency of the excuse to be determined by our Congress when the time for action arrives and the issue is clearly defined.

I venture to express the hope that the proposed League, being a child, so to speak, of the European war and being nourished by the spirit of preparedness which has been so assiduously cultivated in this country, will find its final repose in the calm that will follow the restoration of peace. Then we may expect a reaction against militarism and a clearer vision of America's mission as the ex-

ponent of peace based upon love, friendship and co-operation. I cannot conclude without expressing my appreciation of the courtesy with which Mr. Taft has conducted his part of this discussion. It has been a real pleasure to join him in bringing before the public the issues raised by the League.

FINAL STATEMENTS IN THE LIGHT OF LATE EVENTS

Mr. Taft's Final Statement in the Light of Late Events

SINCE this discussion began, and indeed since the tenth paper was written, the plot of the world drama now being enacted has developed with startling rapidity. Even as we have been arguing, a World League to Enforce Peace has been formed; and the United States has taken its proper part therein. The absolutism of Russia has been toppled over in the twinkling of an eye; and the Russian people have taken charge. Germany, in a ruthless disregard of the rights of American citizens, has forced the United States, as a self-respecting nation, to take up the sword against her. The United States is thus driven into an alliance with the Entente Allies. The democracies of Russia, Italy, France, England and the United States are now engaged in a death struggle with the dynasties of the Hohenzollerns and the Hapsburgs to end the only substantial military absolutism remaining in the world. Military dynasties are a threat against the peace of the world. With their lust

for power and the selfish considerations that affect their policies, their respect for the solemn obligations of a treaty are much less than that of democracies. Democracies are not perfect in their sense of justice, in their certainly peaceful policies, or in their exact observance of treaty obligations; but they are a vast improvement in these respects over an autocracy dependent on military force.

The Prussian autocracy of Germany is the great international criminal. It has sacrificed honour; it has murdered men and women and has, in numberless ways, violated with ruthless cruelty the principles of international law to accomplish its dynastic purposes. It has dragged its allies with it, and made them *participes criminis*. The League of the United States and the Entente Allies, and the Central and South American countries that may join us, is an organization of world power to inflict condign destruction on the dynasties whose continued existence constitutes an obstruction to Law and Peace. We are properly separating the Hohenzollerns and the Hapsburgs, and the great German people and the great people of the Dual Monarchy. If we succeed, as we must, the war, dreadful as it has been in the losses and

suffering it has entailed, painful and destructive as it is likely to be, will be worth all it cost. It will make the future of the world depend upon the rule of the peoples of the world, will exalt the reign of international justice, and will organise the joint forces of the world to maintain it. With the German and the Austrian and Hungarian peoples on the one side, and the American, English, French, Italian and Russian peoples on the other, in an international conference, none will hesitate to enter a League to Enforce Peace. The popular character of all the governments, in and of itself, will render war between them less probable, will give greater sanction to their promises, and will make more practical and less burdensome a League having for its purpose compulsory procedure for the settlement of irritating international disputes.

"Whom the gods wish to destroy they first make mad." The people of the United States, immersed in business, lethargic with prosperity, naturally averse to war and its new horrors as shown in the present struggle, have been loath to take the sword. They have made every honourable effort to keep out of the vortex. But Germany, in her mad desperation and with a lack of foresight

that has characterised all her diplomatic policies, has forced an unwilling people to join the League of her opponents. The triumph of Democracy in Russia and the entry of the United States into the war make clear to the world and to history that this is a war for the benefit of mankind.

The rulers of Germany have undervalued the power of the United States. They have made military efficiency their national god. A country which has, up to this, ignored the military science, and has failed to maintain a trained army, arouses in them contempt. In their mad rage at England and in their desire to starve her people, they have stupidly aroused against themselves the only dangerous antagonist in the world remaining. When money and food and supplies are more clearly the determining factor in the war than ever before, they deliberately make an enemy of the country which has greater capacity to furnish them than all other countries combined. The military unpreparedness of the United States blinds them to the enormous advantage which her accession to the ranks of their opponents gives in the test of endurance which must decide the struggle. Within a month after her declaration of war, the United States will place at the disposal of her allies, the

enormous sum of three billions of dollars, to replenish their depleted treasuries and to strengthen the effectiveness of their serried hosts. Her resources in the production of food and war supplies are being promptly organized so that the energies of this country will be directed to feeding the peoples of her allies and supporting and maintaining the equipment of their armies. The skill and courage of her navy, with the ingenuity of her inventors, will be directed to the suppression of the sole hope of the Prussian military hierarchy, the cruel, lawless and murderous weapon as used by it, the submarine.

The broad conception of the world-cause the United States is fighting will send the blood tingling through her giant limbs and awaken in her that moral strength which the Hohenzollern in his plan to conquer the world has consistently ignored.

The struggle may be a long one. We do not aid our cause by under-estimating the power of our enemy or the perfection attained by her in the organization and use of physical and material resources, and of a people educated and moulded to the needs of a military autocracy. We hope the contest may end in a year. It may last double

that or longer; but however long it lasts, the end is not in doubt. We were slow in getting in. We will never quit until our high purpose is attained; and the cause of Democracy is triumphant. We should not rely on the pleasing hope that our losses will chiefly be in contributions of money. We should organize our efforts and make our plans with the stern thought that many of our best lives and of the flower of our youth will figure largely in the cost of our victory; but the greatness of our cause should reconcile us to every sacrifice. When we, by our intervention, shall have contributed largely to the victory, when our real enemies shall have disappeared in the deposition of the Hohenzollerns and the Hapsburgs, the influence for good that we, without motive of aggrandisement, without hope or wish to increase our territory or power, can wield in the councils of the world will be commanding and will make for a just peace and a World League to maintain it.

"God works in mysterious ways his wonders to perform." It would seem that there was now being disclosed the providential plan for securing the future peace of the world. Everything that has happened is forcing on the adoption of a League to Enforce Peace. Events are shaping

themselves so that when the Congress of nations meets, after the end shall have come, the League will be as natural a result as peace itself. How futile in the face of the facts of to-day seem the arguments that we must preserve our isolation and avoid entangling alliances! How inapplicable Washington's words, wise when uttered, become to the needs and policy of the present! The League to Enforce Peace is formed; and we have joined it. On its success and permanence depends the future peace of the sons of men.

Mr. Bryan's Answer in the Light of Late Events

WHILE great changes have taken place since Mr. Taft and I entered upon this discussion, they do not materially affect the matter at issue.

The question under consideration is whether the United States shall, after this war is over, enter into such an agreement as that proposed by the League To Enforce Peace.

A review of the arguments heretofore presented will make it clear that our entrance into this war does not furnish any reason or excuse for obligating ourselves to aid in the settlement of the European disputes which may arise hereafter.

We are at war with Germany because she violated our rights, sunk our ships and drowned our citizens. There is no reason to believe that we would have entered this war but for the invasion of our rights. It is true that Germany's actions indicated a determination to pursue a policy that menaced the welfare of ALL neutral nations;

and this furnished added reasons for the action taken by Congress in declaring a state of war to exist. It is true, also, that many were influenced to vote for war because they felt the overthrow of Prussianism necessary to World Peace. But, however weighty the other arguments may have been, they would not have caused this nation to enter the war but for the actual invasion of the rights of its own citizens.

It must be remembered, also, that our Nation enters this war by the formal action of Congress —the body in which the Constitution vests the power to declare war. It will be seen, therefore, that the League to Enforce Peace cannot use our entrance into this war to support its plan. The League proposes that, in advance of any cause of war, we shall authorize a council or committee—which we cannot hope to control—to call us into a war even when there has been no invasion of our rights.

We are now in a world-war surpassing any former conflict in cost, whether measured by money or men; and a United Nation will support the Government to the end. But, in view of the uncertainties which lie before us, it is surely the part of wisdom to await the conclusion of this war

before pledging ourselves to embark on such a course as that proposed by the League to Enforce Peace. Why should we deny ourselves the advantage of the experience which we shall gain during this war?

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